Notes on the tactical debate on Afghanistan
The mass media in this country has decided that the only debate about Canada’s role in Afghanistan is a discussion of the tactics being used. The Department of National Defence is happy that the discussion is that shallow. It deflects opposition and confuses a rather simple issue. Unfortunately, some in the peace movement have jumped into this discussion providing an undue legitimacy to the debate. Peacekeeping in support of the warlords is no better than combat in support of the warlords. The issue is support for the warlords, not the tactical choices made by Canadian soldiers and generals. These warlord groups are seen as the enemies of the Afghan people. Any support for them is an attack on the democratic aspirations of the majority of the population there.To read the annual reports about Afghanistan from Human Rights Watch you may think you are stuck in a time warp. Each and every year the point is the same: "Despite the (Taliban) insurgency’s growing strength, the majority of Afghans cited the numerous regional warlords as the greatest source of insecurity".
HRW report 2005 :
"Political repression, human rights abuses, and criminal activity by warlords—the leaders of militias and remnants of past Afghan military forces, who were brought to power with the assistance of the United States after the Taliban’s defeat—are consistently listed as the chief concerns of most Afghans."
HRW report 2004 :
"Life outside of Kabul is dominated by military faction leaders—Afghanistan's warlords. In most areas outside the capital, independent political movements and media have been stifled: in many areas it is impossible to form political groups or freely publish newspapers or broadcast radio without incurring the wrath of local warlord leaders. Women and girls especially are suffering from insecurity and lack of protection. In some areas, security and human rights conditions have actually gotten worse, and most warlords have become more entrenched. "
HRW Report 2003 :
In the parliamentary elections of October 18th 2005 more than 60% of those elected are known warlords and Taliban commanders who are making a killing from the opium trade which is bringing $2-3 billion to Afghanistan annually. This governmental structure was set in the December 2001 meeting between Hamid Karzai, US officials and representatives of the warlord groups. In the following years the power of the warlords has become further entrenched. What therefore will the tactical debate clear up? Even if Canadian soldiers can change their hats and become peacekeepers in Afghanistan they will remain under the policy framework decided on in Bonn. To make a decision to no longer support the warlords Stephen Harper would have to publicly do the following: 1. Denounce US policy in Afghanistan 2. Denounce NATO policy in support of the US 3. End official support for the current Afghan government There is not a shred of hope that Stephen Harper would commit to any of the above. Canadian soldiers will remain in danger until they are brought home because they are supporting a corrupt and violent government. How they support that government is irrelevant. The democratic hopes of the Afghan people will not be realized by a set of policies decided upon by the Bush administration.
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